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This Dissertation aims to provide a differentiated answer to the research question “What 
drives banks’ contribution to systemic risk during periods of financial turmoil?” This 
research also distinguishes between contribution to local and contribution to global 
systemic risk in order to shed light on how banks’ contribution to systemic risk differs 
across various regions. A sample of international banks covering 39 countries is analyzed 
for this purpose. The selected crisis periods are the Global Financial Crisis around the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, as well as the first and the second peak of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Supporting conjectures 
from earlier risk literature, several bank-specific accounting variables are found to enable 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. More 
precisely, the size of a bank and its market-to-book ratio are found to be positively related 
to systemic risk while a bank’s profitability is found to be negatively related.  In addition, 
more powerful regulatory supervisors are found to be negatively related to systemic risk 
while greater capital stringency imposed by regulators is found to be negatively related 
to systemic risk. However, most of the variables lose their statistical significance during 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, which supports previous findings suggesting that 
drivers of systemic risk vary over crisis periods and might even be unique to each crisis 
episode.  
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Esta Dissertação tem como objetivo fornecer uma resposta diferenciada à pergunta de 
pesquisa "Quais os determinantes da contribuição dos bancos para o risco sistémico 
durante períodos de instabilidade financeira?" Esta investigação efectua igualmente uma 
distinção entre contribuição para o risco sistémico local e global, a fim de esclarecer como 
é que a contribuição dos bancos para o risco sistémico difere nas várias regiões. É 
analisado, para este fim, uma amostra de bancos internacionais que abrange 39 países. Os 
períodos de crise selecionados são a Crise Financeira Global em torno do colapso da 
Lehman Brothers em 2008, assim como o primeiro e o segundo pico da Crise das Dívida 
Soberana europeia nos anos de 2010 e 2011, respetivamente. Como complemento das 
conjeturas da literatura de risco anteriormente elaboradas, várias variáveis contabilísticas 
específicas dos bancos influenciam a contribuição dos bancos para o risco sistémico 
durante a Crise Financeira Global de 2008. Mais precisamente, a dimensão do banco e o 
rácio ‘market-to-book’ do mercado bancário estão positivamente relacionados com o 
risco sistémico, enquanto que a rentabilidade de um banco está negativamente 
relacionada. Além disso, os supervisores regulatórios mais poderosos estão 
negativamente relacionados ao risco sistémico, embora o major rigor dos requisitos de 
capital impostos pelos reguladores também seja considerado estar negativamente 
relacionado ao risco sistémico. Contudo, a maior parte das variáveis perde a sua 
significância estatística durante a crise da Dívida Soberana europeia, o que suporta as 
descobertas científicas anteriores, que sugerem que os fatores de risco sistémico variam 
ao longo dos períodos de crise e possam até ser exclusivos para cada uma das crises. 
[…] 
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This research analyzes key drivers of banks’ contribution to both local and global 
systemic risk during recent prominent crisis periods on a global level. More precisely, the 
Global Financial Crisis around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, as 
well as the first peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the Greek bailout 
agreement in May 2010 and the second peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
around the Greek austerity package in June 2011 are carefully analyzed.  
In the academic literature systemic risk is defined as the risk of either malfunctions within 
the system or external shocks causing breakdowns in the entire regional or global 
economy, in contrast to the failure of just a few institutions (Kaufmann and Scott, 2003). 
It is characterized by co-movements among most or all institutions of the system, either 
due to a shock producing nearly simultaneous adverse effects on the entire economy, or 
by an event initiating a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets 
(Kaufmann and Scott, 2003). As noted by Moreno and Peña (2012), the malfunctions and 
macro-shocks causing breakdowns can be related to a great variety of mechanisms. The 
latter range from excessive credit expansion or correlated exposures and asset bubbles to 
negative externalities arising from banks considered “too big to fail” for instance, or from 
information disruptions causing freezes in the interbank market. In this regard, it is of 
particular interest for regulators whether the determinants of banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk persist over breakdowns related to these various types of shocks and 
malfunctions. If this is the case, regulation authorities could identify the most 
systemically important banks and take preventive actions. Lowering banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk in the financial sector is of key interest, since, as shown by Klingbiel et 
al. (2007) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) among others, banking crises have a real 
impact on the growth in other sectors and can spread over the entire economy. From 2008 
on, when large banks stood in the center of the financial crisis and revealed shortcomings 
in systemic risk regulation, the debate on determinants of banks’ contribution to systemic 
risk has intensified, involving more and more academics, economists and regulators. In 
fact, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, regulators around the world 
introduced new regulatory tools to lower the likelihood of bank failures, such as the Basel 
III protocol, restrictions on loan-to-value ratios for bank loans to particular sectors, and 
the accounting standard IFRS10, making it more difficult to hide risk off balance sheet 
for instance (Benoit et al., 2015). In addition, the said crisis led to the restructuring of 
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bank supervision in Europe and in the U.S.  towards a more centralized architecture, with 
more power for the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (Benoit et al. (2015). 
To measure banks’ contribution to systemic risk, the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
measure proposed by Acharya (2010) is applied in this study. This measure is defined as 
the expected loss on a given bank´s equity return when the aggregated market experiences 
outcomes below a critical threshold over a selected time period. Accordingly, the main 
research question associated with this Dissertation thus addresses whether differences in 
this measure between pre- and post- crisis periods can be explained by a set of bank-
specific accounting variables, regulatory variables accounting for differences in bank 
regulation across countries as well as a set of standard macroeconomic control variables. 
First, it is investigated whether the Marginal Expected Shortfall captures increases in 
local and global systemic risk during the selected crisis periods, and how banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk differs across various regional areas. In a second step, cross-
sectional regressions are estimated for each crisis period respectively, in order to identify 
determinants of banks’ contribution to systemic risk, and to observe whether there exists 
any persistency among them. The findings suggest that several bank-specific and 
regulatory variables explain banks’ contribution to both global and local systemic risk 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. More precisely, bank size, the market-to-book 
ratio and the power of supervisor authorities are positively related to systemic risk. While 
a bank´s operating profit margin and the capital stringency imposed by regulatory regimes 
are negatively related to systemic risk. However, most of these variables lose their 
significance during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, supporting previous findings 
sustaining that drivers of systemic risk vary across crisis periods.  
This study is most closely related to Bostandzic et al. (2014), who analyze determinants 
of banks’ contribution to systemic risk for numerous periods of international financial 
turmoil, ranging from the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994, over the terroristic attacks in 2001 
to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. However, their research does not cover an analysis 
of the more recent European Sovereign Debt Crisis, which is appropriately included in 
the present research. 
This Dissertation is organized as follows: section two reviews some important related 
literature, section three explains the data used and the methodology applied in this 
research, section four provides an overview of the independent variables, section five 
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describes and discusses descriptive statistics, section 6 discusses the findings associated 
with this research, and,  lastly, section 7 contains the conclusion. 
2 Literature Review 
 
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008, followed by the most severe global economic 
slowdown since the Great Depression, was a sterling example of financial contagion and 
risk spillovers across financial institutions (e.g. Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012), 
Dumontaux and Pop (2013), Longstaff (2010)). This extreme financial event motivated a 
great deal of academic studies to propose new ways of measuring systemic risk and to 
identify the key drivers of systemic risk during periods of financial turmoil. Size, 
leverage, and non-interest income are among the most prominently cited determinants of 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk in the literature that emerged after the said financial 
crisis. These determinants have been found to be persistent drivers of systemic risk across 
various time periods and geographical areas as well as for an increasing variety of 
systemic risk measures.  
Hovakimian et al. (2012) analyze variation in systemic risk at U.S. commercial banks 
with at least one million dollars in total assets during 1974 to 2010, using a measure of 
systemic risk that is based on the Merton model. Merton (1974) assumes that firms default 
if the asset value becomes lower than the face value of debt. Merton (1974) further shows 
that, whenever a firm`s equity value reaches zero, the corresponding shareholders have 
already lost everything and, as the limited liability principle states that shareholders are 
not obligated to put down extra capital, stockholders’ stakes in such a firm can be viewed 
as a call option on firm assets. Risky debt then might be viewed as the value of risk-free 
debt plus a short put option on the firm´s assets. Hovakimian et al. (2012) divide the value 
of this limited liability put option by the face value of the banks’ debt to obtain the fair 
value of the annual premium for insuring one dollar of debt against creditor losses due to 
default. In a subsequent step, these authors estimate this insurance premium measure for 
a value-weighted portfolio containing all sampled U.S. banks. Finally, the authors 
calculate the contribution of bank i to systemic risk as the difference between the 
insurance premium for the portfolio that includes bank i, and the insurance premium for 
the portfolio that excludes bank i. The authors estimate the annualized quarterly value of 
this systemic risk measure to construct a quarterly time series of this measure over the 
period from 1974 to 2010. The authors find that systemic risk reached unprecedented 
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highs during the financial crisis years 2008-2009, and that bank size, leverage, and asset 
risk are key drivers of systemic risk. 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2019) focus on publicly traded bank holding companies in the U.S. 
for a sample period from 1986 to 2008 and measure an individual bank´s contribution to 
systemic risk using the ΔCoVaR measure. The authors define this measure as the 
difference between the value at risk (VaR) of the overall financial system conditional on 
bank i being in distress, and the value at risk of the financial system, conditional on bank 
i performing in its median state. They find that banks with higher non-interest income, 
higher leverage, and larger total assets, as well as higher market-to-book ratio, contribute 
more to systemic risk.  
De Jonghe (2009) finds similar results for listed European commercial banks and bank 
holding companies over the period from 1992 to 2007. The author measures systemic risk 
using tail-β estimates defined as the co-crash probability of a given bank and the overall 
banking sector. By running regressions of the tail-β estimates on a set of bank-specific 
variables, the author finds that this measure is increasing with a given bank´s size, 
leverage, and non-interest income. In addition, Black et al. (2016) analyze European 
banks that were included in the stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) in July 2011. The authors’ analysis refers to a period from January 2001 to January 
2013, thus covering both the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. They measure systemic risk as a hypothetical distress insurance premium against 
catastrophic losses in the banking system, which is derived from credit default swaps, 
equity return correlations and a bank`s total liabilities. The authors find that size and 
leverage can forecast increases in systemic risk for European banks during both the 
Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Moreover, Keasey and 
Vallascas (2012) also find supporting results for a sample of banks selected from 17 
European countries that have been listed over the period from 1992 to 2008, using an 
alternative measure to address a bank`s contribution to systemic risk. Initially, they 
estimate daily values of the distance-to-default at the bank level, expressing the number 
of standard deviations that the market value of bank assets is above the default point 
where the market value of assets is below the book value of total liabilities. In a second 
step, they estimate the distance-to-default of the aggregate financial market, which they 
define for each bank as the weighted average of the distance-to-default of the remaining 
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banks in the sample. Then they measure a bank`s contribution to systemic risk as the slope 
coefficient of the regression of the daily relative change in bank i´s distance-to-default on 
the overall distance-to-default of the aggregate market. Accordingly, the authors are able 
to describe how the default risk of bank i reacts to changes in the risk of the banking 
system, with higher values denoting larger exposure to systemic shocks. By running OLS 
regressions of this slope coefficient on a broad set of bank characteristics, the authors find 
that bank size, the share of non-interest income and asset growth are key determinants of 
a bank’s risk exposure. 
The vast majority of empirical studies concerning banks’ contribution to systemic risk 
have focused on developed markets either in North America or in Europe. Significantly 
less have aimed to analyze banks’ contribution to systemic risk on a global level. One of 
the rare studies which does so is Laeven et al. (2016). They construct a local sample using 
publicly listed financial institutions available in the Bankscope database, in order to 
analyze systemic risk from the middle of 2007 to the end of 2008. They measure systemic 
risk using the ΔCoVaR measure and the SRISK index, which they define as the expected 
capital shortage faced by a given bank when the aggregate market declines substantially 
following the approach advanced by Brownlees and Engle (2012). Laeven et al. (2016) 
find that systemic risk grows with banks’ size and bank capital, irrespective of which 
particular systemic risk measure is actually being used. In addition, Engle et al. (2014) 
construct a sample covering 38 countries including 191 banks, each with a market 
capitalization above five billion U.S. dollars. The authors address the period from 1996 
to 2010 and measure banks’ contribution to systemic risk by using the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall measure initially proposed by Acharya et al. (2010). Engle et al. (2014) define 
this measure as the expected loss on the equity return of bank i when the aggregate market 
experiences outcomes below a critical threshold during the selected time period. The 
authors find that non-interest income is significantly and positively associated with 
systemic risk.  
Besides bank-specific accounting variables, there has been increasing evidence in support 
of the argument that differences in supervisory and regulatory regimes across countries 
constitute major determinants for financial stability and systemic risk. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2011) measure bank performance during the Global Financial Crisis, using buy-and-hold 
dollar stock returns over the period from July 2007 to the end of 2008, based on data 
obtained from Bankscope. For financial institutions with total assets above ten billion 
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U.S. dollars, the authors find that banks in countries with more powerful supervisors had 
worse stock returns between July 2007 and December 2008, suggesting that, during the 
crisis, stronger supervisors took more corrective measures that were costly for 
shareholders. Andriosopoulos et al. (2015) use the Marginal Expected Shortfall as a 
dependent variable, in order to measure banks’ contribution to systemic risk during the 
Global Financial Crisis (onwards 2008) and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (in 2011-
2012), for a cross-section of global banks. They demonstrate that capital regulation and 
activity restrictions are negatively related to banks’ contribution to systemic risk. 
 
Bostandzic et al. (2014) also conduct a global study that analyzes the impact of both bank 
specific accounting variables and differences in cross-country regulatory regimes on 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk. The authors also analyze the determinants of the 
contribution of international banks to both global and local systemic risk, in order to shed 
light on the degree at which market disturbances spread over different geographical areas 
and financial markets. Their research covers several prominent financial crises. Using 
pre- and post-crisis period differences in connection to the Marginal Expected Shortfall 
measure as a dependent variable, they find contrasting empirical evidence as follows. 
While for the Global Financial Crisis starting in 2008 many idiosyncratic variables and 
characteristics of regulatory systems can explain the cross-sectional variation in banks’ 
contributions to systemic risk, for prior crisis periods like the East Asia crisis in 1997 or 
the Dotcom bubble in 2000, either  accounting variables cannot explain banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk or these variables lose their statistical and economic 
significance when shifting focus from local to global systemic risk. However, their 
analysis does not cover the more recent European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In the present 
research, their analysis of the determinants of banks’ contribution to both local and global 
systemic risk is extended to include the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
The literature on banks’ contribution to both local and global systemic risk, is 
nevertheless still missing a global analysis, covering more recent periods of financial 
turmoil subsequent to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Researches that analyze 
determinants of systemic risk on a global level and distinguish between contribution to 
local and global systemic risk are still particularly rare to this date. The present 
Dissertation provides further evidence for the main drivers of banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk on a global level and distinguishes between local and global systemic risk 
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in order to shed light on how the degree at which market disturbances spread over 
different geographical areas and financial markets. Therefore, the present Dissertation 
extends the existing academic literature on the fundamental analysis of banks’ 
contribution to both local and global systemic risk by expanding the analysis across 
several financial crises, specifically including the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
3 Methodology & Data Section 
This section defines the selection of crisis dates, the pre-and post-crisis periods for the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the first and second phases of the European Sovereign 
Debt crisis. It further describes the sample design and explains the systemic risk measure 
herein used. 
3.1 Selection of crisis events 
As a first step, the starting dates of the selected financial contagion periods are adequately 
identified. For the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008 (the Lehman moment), which aggravated the initially local U.S. 
credit crisis into a global financial disaster, is identified as a starting point. This approach 
adequately follows the related studies of Bostandzic et al. (2014) and Bartram et al. 
(2007). With respect to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the first Greek bailout 
agreement of May 2, 2010 is identified as a starting point of the first peak, while the Greek 
austerity package imposed by European authorities on June 29, 2011 is identified as the 
starting date of the second peak. This approach follows Filoso et al. (2017) who identify 
those two events as climaxes to the said crisis periods, and Black et al. (2016) who find 
that systemic risk of European banks reached its height following these events.  In May 
2010, Greece signed a three-year bailout agreement with the EU and the IMF, including 
a total of 80 billion euros in bilateral loans from other EU countries and another 30 billion 
from the IMF, at below market interest rates. In return, Greece committed itself to reduce 
its massive the deficit to three percent of its GDP by 2014 (Kosmidou et al. (2014)). In 
June 2011, eurozone ministers committed Greece to take new severe austerity measures 
before it might receive the next tranche of its loans and proposed harsh penalties for 
misaligned behavior (Kosmidou et al., 2014).                                                         
Figure 1 displays the price history of the MSCI World Index from January 2005 to 
December 2014, thus covering all three selected crisis events. Figure 2 displays the 
average systemic risk of sampled international banks measured by the Marginal Expected 
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Shortfall proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) and estimated using rolling windows of 180 
trading days. The Marginal Expected Shortfall is explained in greater technical detail in 
the following section. The global stock market index sharply decreased while systemic 
risk peaked during all the selected crisis periods. Both figures clearly identify the crisis 
around the collapse of Lehman Brothers as the most severe financial crisis. 
Figure 1 
Price history of the MSCI World Index from January 2005 to December 2014 
 
 




Average systemic risk of sampled international banks measured by the Marginal Expected Shortfall 
measure proposed by Acharya et al. (2010)  
 
 
Source: To calculate the average MES daily stock price data was obtained from Datastream 
t 
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3.2 Measuring systemic risk 
To estimate the contribution of an individual bank to the risk of the aggregated financial 
market, the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) measure proposed by Acharya et al. 
(2010) is applied, following Bostandzic et al. (2014). The MES is rapidly gaining 
recognition as a highly relevant systemic risk measure. This is not least because of the 
MES-based and frequently updated rankings of the systemic importance of U.S. financial 
institutions, that are published on the website of NYU, and because of the claims by 
Acharya et al. (2010), that the MES would have been capable to predict the losses incurred 
by financial institutions in the U.S during the Global Financial Crisis (Banulescu and 
Dumitrescu, 2013). Nevertheless, some authors have pointed out that the MES measure 
does not account for the level of firm characteristics. Thus, from a theoretical perspective 
a small unleveraged financial institution could appear more systemically relevant than a 
big and heavily leveraged one (Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2013). The MES of an 
individual bank is defined as the expected loss on a given bank’s equity return when the 
aggregated market experiences outcomes below a critical threshold over a selected time 
period (Acharya et al., 2010). This means that in order to calculate the MES for a time 
period [T1,T2] with a threshold level of five percent, the five percent worst returns for 
the aggregated market are selected, and then the average log return on the equity of an 
individual bank is computed for these days via the following: 
𝑀𝐸𝑆!;[$!$"]
&% = −	𝐸{𝑅(!|𝑀( 	> 	𝑃)	(	1 − 0.5)}	                    (1) 
where 𝑅!"  is individual bank i`s daily log equity return, Mt is the log equity return of the 
aggregate financial market and PM is the percentile function of M. Following the usual 
convention in the risk literature dealing with the MES, CoVar, or other related systemic 
risk measures the sign is flipped to make the MES a positive number, simplifying 
interpretation.  
 
Following Bostandzic et al. (2014), the change in an individual banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk during financial turmoil episodes is estimated by computing the difference 
between the bank`s pre- and post-crisis MES with a threshold level of five percent. In line 
with Amihud et al. (2012) and Bostandzic et al. (2014), the chosen daily windows for the 
pre- and-post crisis periods are [-180; -11] and [+11; +180] respectively. The formula for 




&%                                    (2) 
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To estimate the degree at which market disturbances spread over different geographical 
areas and financial markets, the MES is computed with respect to value-weighted local 
and global bank indices constructed by using the entire sample of banks used in the 
analysis following the approach advanced by Bostandzic et al. (2014). In order to 
construct the value-weighted local bank indices, each bank is assigned to one out of five 
geographical areas (Africa, Asia/Pacific; Europe; North America; South America) based 
on the location of the respective headquarters. Then the individual banks’ equity returns 
are value-weighted, by using their corresponding market capitalization. 
3.3 Cross-sectional regressions 
In order to identify the key factors driving changes in individual banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk between the pre- and post-crisis periods, the change in the banks’ MES with 
respect to both local and global indices is regressed on a set of firm-specific accounting 
variables, a set of macroeconomic control variables, and a set of variables controlling for 
the banks’ regulatory environment. These cross-sectional regressions are estimated for 
each crisis respectively. 
																	ΔMES/,1
&% = a/ +		β+2 bank/,1		 +	β42macro/,1		 + 𝛽52reg/,1																					 						(3) 
Where a/ represents the constant, bank/,1		is a vector of bank-specific accounting 
variables, macro/,1		is a vector of macroeconomic control variables, reg/,1		is a vector of 
regulatory control variables, and β+2 , β42 ,and 𝛽52  are their associated coefficient vectors. 
3.4 Data 
Data for this research is obtained from three different databases, as follows: i) stock price 
data and bank specific accounting variables are obtained from Datastream; ii) 
macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the WDI database; and iii) regulatory 
control variables are obtained from the database constructed by Barth et al. (2013). 
Respectively for each of the selected periods of financial turmoil, a sample is constructed 
by obtaining daily stock-price data for all commercial banks (SIC codes: 6021; 6022; 
6029) and savings institutions (SIC codes: 6035 and 6036) available on Datastream. By 
restricting the sample to commercial banks for each period, insurance companies, 
investment management companies, brokers and primarily investment banks are excluded 
from the sample. The selection also includes banks from Datastream`s dead-firm list, in 
order to avoid potential issues arising from survivorship bias. In order to deal with 
potential issues arising from outliers, the extreme values for bank-specific accounting 
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variables are limited by winsorizing the data at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Following 
Bostandzic et al. (2014), several screening procedures are also applied, as per the 
following four steps.  First, all banks with incomplete stock-price data for the pre-and 
post-crisis period are excluded from the sample. Second, banks with incomplete 
accounting data with respect to the independent variables used in the cross-sectional 
regressions are also excluded. Bostandzic et al. (2014) note that, for the vast majority of 
banks with lacking accounting data in Datastream´s firmlist, annual reports could be 
obtained from public sources, which reduces potential biases caused by systemically 
riskier banks simply being less transparent. Third, banks with headquarters in countries 
that are not covered by the WDI database or the database constructed by Barth et al. 
(2013) are also excluded. Fourth, following Karolyi et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2011), 
banks for which the stock price drops below $1 for the pre- or-post crisis period are 
likewise excluded from the sample. 
Table 1 displays the regional distribution of banks in the sample for all three crisis 
periods. Banks are predominantly located in North America, followed by banks in 
Europe. The sample for the period around the collapse of Lehman Brothers comprises 
642 banks of which 432 are located in North America and 154 in Europe. Only 33 banks 
are located in the Asia/Pacific region and 23 banks come from the remaining geographic 
areas. On the other hand, the samples for the crisis periods around the Greek bailout 
agreement and the Greek austerity package are comprised of 632 and 616 banks, 
respectively, and have a similar regional distribution of banks. 
 
Table 1 




4 Independent Variables 
This section presents the independent variables used to help explain sources of individual 
banks contribution to global and local systemic risk during the crisis around the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers (the Lehman moment) in 2008 and the two peaks of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
4.1 Firm-specific accounting variables 
4.1.1 Profitability 
The first bank-specific accounting variable used in the cross-sectional regression is a 
given bank´s operating profit margin (OPM), which stands as a proxy for profitability. In 
general, investors perceive more profitable banks to be equipped with better abilities to 
replenish capital reserves and thus to have lower exposure to tail and default risk. 
Consequently, this should reduce these banks’ contribution to the systemic risk of the 
aggregate financial market (Oordt and Zhou, 2016).  In addition, some authors like 
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) as well as Keeley (1990) argue that shareholders of banks 
with higher profits and higher expected future profits have more to lose if the bank 
becomes insolvent, which lowers risk taking incentives for more profitable banks. 
However, higher profitability could actually steam from successful engagement in risky 
non-lending trading activities and thus might indicate higher default risk (Bostandzic et 
al., 2014). Nevertheless, a given bank´s OPM is expected to have a negative effect on the 
said bank’s contribution to local as well as global systemic risk regardless of the 
geographic regions the sampled banks come from. 
4.1.2 Size 
The natural logarithm of total asset (LNTA) is used as a measure of a bank`s size. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) describes a bank`s size as a key measure 
of systemic importance. Financial distress or the bankruptcy of banks whose activities 
represent a larger portion of overall economic activity, are more likely to have a greater 
systematic impact. Larger banks tend to be more interconnected and to have greater 
overall complexity, making them more likely to cause financial distress in other banks. 
This process makes the liquidation of larger banks more costly and time consuming 
during crisis periods (Bostandzic and Weiß, 2018). In addition, an increased probability 
of governmental protection in the case of bankruptcy for banks that are considered “too 
big to fail” might strengthen their manager´s incentives to engage in additional risk-taking 
activities (Kaufmann, 2014). While some authors like Diamond (1984) and Freixas and 
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Rochet (2008) find that larger banks have a higher profitability and are more efficiently 
diversified, making them better protected when adverse events materialize, others like 
Barros et al. (2007) find that larger and more diversified banks perform  more poorly, 
indicating that small and  specialized banks can reduce asymmetric information problems 
associated with lending more efficiently. Overall, bank size is expected to have a 
significant positive effect on the banks’ contribution to local as well as global systemic 
risk regardless of where the banks are located. 
4.1.3 Market-to-book ratio 
Rau and Vermalen (1998) find that managers of so-called glamour firms with a low book- 
to-market ratio tend to be more likely to engage in excessive risk taking to increase firm 
value than managers of high book-to-market firms. In order to proxy for the related 
overconfidence of bank managers a bank’s market-to-book ratio (M/B) is included as an 
independent variable in the cross-sectional regressions. The market-to-book ratio is 
expected to enter the regressions with a positive sign.  
4.1.4 Leverage 
Following Bostandzic et al. (2014), the capital structure of a given bank is approximated 
by the ratio of total debt-to-total assets (D/A). Since the Global Financial Crisis, a number 
of authors have argued that high financial leverage contributed substantially to the failure 
of various financial institutions, by inducing banks to engage in risky subprime lending 
and trading activities (e.g. Acharya and Thakor (2016); Adrian and Shin (2010)). The 
debt-to-asset ratio is thus expected to enter the cross-sectional regressions with a positive 
sign, although unsecured bank liabilities may increase market discipline due to 
monitoring by unsecured creditors, and thus turn bank managers away from risky asset 
choices as noted by Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
4.1.5 Non-interest income 
Finally, the natural logarithm of non-interest-income (LN-NII) is used as an independent 
variable in the cross-sectional regressions, in order to measure income from activities 
other than the traditional deposit and lending activities, such as securitization and 
derivatives trading. It has been argued that greater dependence on non-interest income 
generating activities increases diversification by providing accesses to a broader range of 
markets and thus stabilizes profits (Lepetit et al., 2008). However, many authors have 
found non-interest income generating activities to represent a more volatile source of 
 14 
banking revenues, and thus increasing vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks and 
adverse events. (e.g. Chen et al. (2016); Stiroh and Rumble (2006)). In addition, Wagner 
(2010) argues that banks engaging in non-interest income generating processes will 
increasingly hold similar portfolios, so that even though those activities might reduce 
individual bank risk, they will increase systemic risk due to a higher possibility of joint 
failure. In fact, banks’ diversification into banks non-traditional banking activities has 
become a critical concern for regulators in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
and in the Dodd-Frank bill, which is actually aimed at curtailing proprietary trading 
(Moshirian, 2011). Brunnermeier et al. (2019) identify non-interest income as a 
significant factor driving the contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk of the 
aggregated system over several decades.  
 
4.2 Macroeconomic control variables 
Following Bostandzic et al. (2014), standard macroeconomic country controls obtained 
from the WDI database are included in the cross-sectional regressions. More precisely, 
the annual percentage growth of GDP and inflation, as measured by the annual growth 
rate of the GDP implicit deflator, are included. Furthermore, the rule of law estimator 
(ROL) capturing to what extent agents have confidence in contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police and courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence is obtained 
for each country in the sample.  The last country control included is the annual WDI 
political stability indicator capturing political stability and the absence of terrorism. 
 
4.3 Regulatory control variables 
Several regulatory variables are included in the regressions in order to control for 
differences in regulatory regimes across countries and to examine the hypothesis that a 
more restrictive regulation of banks prevents bank losses when adverse shocks 
materialize. 
First, the overall capital stringency index (C.String.) measures the stringency of the 
minimum capital adequacy. Second, the supervisor power index (SUB.Power) measures 
to which extent authorities are able to take preventive or corrective actions if necessary. 
Third, the supervisory independence index (Indepen.)  captures the degree to which the 
supervisory authority is legally protected from the financial industry and independent of 
the government.  
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Table 2 
The table displays an overview of variable names, definitions and their data-sources. 
 
Name                            Definition Database  
Bank-specific accounting variables 
OPM 
 
Operating profit margin in percent defined as the ratio of 




Natural logarithm of total assets Datastream  
M/B 
 
Market to book ratio Datastream  
D/A 
 





Natural logarithm of banks’ Non-interest income Datastream  




Annual percentage growth of GDP 
 
WDI database  
Infl. 
 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP 
implicit deflator 
WDI database  
ROL 
 
Rule of law estimator ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher 
values indicating lower probability of crime and violence 
WDI database  
STAB 
 
Political stability indicator ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with 
higher value indicating greater stability 




Overall capital stringency index raging from 0-10 with 
higher values indicating greater stringency of capital 
regulations 
Barth et al. (2013)  
Sub.Power 
 
Supervisor power index ranging from 0 to 14 with higher 
values indicating more powerful supervisor authorities 
Barth et al. (2013)  
Independ. 
 
Supervisor Independence index ranging from 0 to 4 with 
higher values indicating greater independence 
Barth et al. (2013)  
5 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the 
analysis of the key drivers of systemic risk during recent financial crisis periods. 
Descriptive statistics for bank-specific accounting variables and the macroeconomic 
control variables are presented in Table 3, while descriptive statistics are displayed in the 
Appendix. As presented in Table 3, right before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, banks in the sample had higher market-to-book ratios and were more 
heavily leveraged on average compared to the other crisis periods during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis.  The average debt-to-asset ratio was 19.50 percent for the crisis 
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associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 15.89 percent during the crisis around 
the Greek bailout agreement and 15.21 percent during the second peak of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. The average market-to-book ratio during the crisis in 2008 was 
1.28, whereas it was 1.11 and 1.05 during the first and second peaks associated with the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis respectively. In addition, sampled banks had, on average 
a lower operating profit margin around the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The average 
operating profit margin (defined as the ratio of operating income to net sales) was 11.11 
percent for the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 12.58 percent for the first peak and 15.58 
percent for the second peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, respectively. 
Table 3 
The table displays summary statistics for bank-specific data obtained from Datastream and for 
macroeconomic variables obtained from the WDI database used in the cross-sectional regressions. The 
dataset contains 642 banks for the financial crisis, 632 banks for the first phase of the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis around the Greek bailout agreement in May 2010 and 616 banks for the second phase of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the Greek austerity package in June 2011. Ratios are presented in 




Table 4 displays a comparison involving bank-specific accounting data of European 
banks, North American banks, and banks in the Asia/Pacific region for the three crisis 
periods respectively. With respect to all crisis periods, the European banks in the sample 
are on average larger in terms of total assets. The average natural logarithm of total assets 
ranges from 17.65 to 17.98 across the three crisis periods for European banks and from 
14.18 to 14.44 for North American Banks. Moreover, European banks are more heavily 
leveraged and have higher non-interest income than North American banks and banks 
from the Asia/Pacific region, and on average have higher market-to-book ratios than 
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North American banks. All these variables are expected to be positively related to banks’ 
contribution to local and global systemic risk. 
Table 4 
The table displays summary statistics for bank-specific accounting data obtained from Datastream and for 
macroeconomic variables obtained from the WDI database used in the cross-sectional regressions. The 
dataset contains 642 banks for the financial crisis around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, 632 banks for the first phase of the European sovereign debt crisis around the Greek bailout 
agreement in May 2010 and 616 banks for the second phase of the European sovereign debt crisis around 
the Greek austerity package in June 2011. Ratios are presented in percentage terms while absolute items 




Remarkably, the banks covered by the sample and located in the Asia/Pacific region have 
on average the highest operating profit margins through all three crisis events. Overall, 
these statistics suggest that, on average, European banks tend to play a more important 
role for the systemic risk of the overall financial markets than North American do. 
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6 Results 
This section discusses the main findings of the empirical analysis designed to identify the 
key drivers of international banks’ contribution to systemic risk during the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008, the first peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the 
Greek bailout agreement in May 2010 and the second peak of the latter crisis around the 
Greek austerity package in June 2011. First, the results for the estimates of the changes 
in the MES systemic risk measure between pre- and post-crisis periods are presented. In 
order to shed light on how financial contagion spills over to various geographical areas, 
results are presented with respect to both global and local market indices.  In the second 
part the results of the cross-sectional regressions are also presented. 
6.1 Contribution to systemic risk 
Table 5 presents the changes in the MES systemic risk measure between pre- and post-
crisis periods, to local and global sector indices and for each crisis respectively. Estimates 
are presented for the total sample as well as for subsamples of North American banks, 
European banks, and banks located in the Asia/Pacific region. 
The average of the MES measure of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk increased for 
all crisis episodes between pre- and post-crisis periods with respect to both local and 
global sector indices, providing evidence for regional as well as international financial 
contagion. All estimates are statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
difference is most pronounced for the Global Financial Crisis around the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. For the total sample of international banks, the 
difference in the average of the marginal expected shortfall of individual banks equals 
0.0273 with respect to local value-weighted bank-sector indices and 0.0295 with respect 
to a global value-weighted sector index. Interestingly, the contribution of individual 
banks to local systemic risk is lower than to global systemic risk for the Global Financial 
Crisis around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which might indicate the greater 
impact on the global system than on regional specific financial institutions. The estimates 
for the first peak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the Greek bailout 
agreement in May 2010 equal 0.0061 with respect to local sector indices and 0.0046 with 
respect to a global sector index. For the second peak of the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis around the Greek austerity package in June 2010, the estimates are 0.0136 with 
respect to local sector indices and 0.0155 with respect to a global sector index. Given 
these results, the average contribution of individual banks around the globe was 
 19 
substantially greater during the second part of the European sovereign debt crisis 
compared to the first phase of the said crisis. 
 
Table 5 
The table displays the change between the average pre- and post-crisis Marginal Expected Shortfall of 
individual banks with respect to local and global value-weighted bank sector indices respectively around 
the three financial crises that are analyzed in this paper.   
 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level, **   Statistical significance at the 5% level, *     Statistical significance at 
the 10% level. 
 
In the following, differences in the pre-and post- crisis change of banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk across various subsamples of banks in distinctive geographical areas are 
described. As presented in Table 5 for the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the average 
contribution to systemic risk did change most significantly for European banks with 
respect to both local and global indices. These results are not surprising, given the fact, 
that, as reported in Table 4, European banks are larger, have higher non-interest income, 
are more heavily leveraged and have higher market-to-book ratios than North American 
banks for all selected crisis periods.  As described previously in the independent variable 
section, all those variables are expected to have a positive effect on a bank`s contribution 
to systemic risk. However, this does not continue to hold for the episodes around the first 
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and second peaks of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. For these specific episodes, 
ΔMES estimates with respect to a local index are higher for North American banks than 
for European banks, although size, leverage, non-interest income and market-to-book 
ratio were also greater during those periods for European banks in the sample. In addition, 
the ΔMES estimate with respect to a global index is greater for North American banks 
than for European banks during the episode around the first peak of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
6.2 Cross-sectional regressions 
This section represents the results of the cross-sectional regressions. The first part 
describes the result of the regressions for the crisis around the collapse of Lehman 
brothers in September 2008 and the second part focuses on the regression for the period 
associated with the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
6.2.1 Financial crisis in 2008 
As presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, all bank-specific accounting variables 
enter the regressions with the expected sign. The size measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets as well as the market-to-book ratio have a positive effect on banks 
contribution to both local and global systemic risk that is statistically significant at the 
one percent level. This is in line with the findings of Bostandzic et al. (2014) that larger 
and more sophisticated banks contributed more to systemic risk during the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008. Table 6 also provides evidence that banks’ profitability lowers 
its contribution to local and global systemic risk because it provides banks with better 
abilities to replenish capital reserves and thus lowers their exposure to tail and default 
risk. Profitability measured by a bank’s operating profit margin has a negative effect on 
the contribution to global and local systemic risk of international banks, that is significant 
at the five percent level. However, there is no evidence for leverage effecting a bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk, and similar to Bostandzic et al. (2014), there is no support 
for the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2011) that non-interest income increases a bank´s 
contribution to systemic risk.  
Stricter capital requirements imposed by regulatory authorities seem to have impacted 
banks’ contribution to local and global systemic risk negatively, a fact which is in line 
with the hypothesis that that more restrictive regulation of banks can prevent bank losses 
when adverse shocks materialize. The coefficients for capital stringency are negative and 
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statistically significant at the one percent level. However, surprisingly, more powerful 
supervisory authorities and regulatory authorities that are more independent from the 
government as well as better legally protected from the financial industry, have a positive 
impact on banks’ contribution to local and global systemic risk. Beltratti and Stulz (2009) 
argue that this is the case because stronger supervisory authorities tend to take more 
corrective actions that are costly and harmful to shareholders once the crisis has enfolded. 
The coefficient for the supervisor index is positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The coefficient for the supervisor independence index is statistically 
significant at the one percent level for the global ΔMES measure and statistically 
significant at the ten percent level for the local ΔMES measure.  
Table 6 
The table displays the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the changes in the MES systemic risk 
measure on a set of accounting, macroeconomic and regulatory variables for the Global Financial Crisis 
around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The first two columns display the baseline 
regressions and columns 3-5 display various robustness checks. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level, ** Statistical significance at the 5% level, * Statistical significance at the 
10%. level 
 22 
6.2.2 Robustness tests 
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 6 represent various robustness checks to test whether the reported 
findings continue to hold under altered assumptions. Column 3 reports the results of the 
same regression as column 2, with the MES measure defined as a bank’s average daily 
log return when the overall market experiences the two percent worst returns instead of 
the five percent worst returns. The coefficients for size and market-to-book ratio are still 
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level and there is still evidence of 
profitability negatively impacting banks’ contribution to global systemic risk. Following 
Bostandzic et al. (2014), the MES measure is also re-estimated with respect to the MSCI 
World Index instead of using the value-weighted sector index of sampled banks, in order 
to ensure that the findings explain international banks’ contribution to the systemic risk 
of the entire economy and not just to that of the financial industry. As presented in column 
4 of Table 6, the main findings for the bank-specific accounting variables still continue 
to hold. The coefficient for a bank´s operating profit margin even becomes significant at 
the one percent level, while the statistical significance for the market-to-book ratio 
decreases to the five percent level. Moreover, the regression is also re-estimated for a 
subsample restricted to banks with total assets above ten billion U.S. dollars. As presented 
in column 5 the negative and significant impact of a bank`s profitability continues to hold, 
while the significance for the coefficient of a bank´s size disappears.  Interestingly, for 
the subsample of larger banks non-interest income positively effects banks contribution 
to systemic risk, thus validating the importance of the ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ status. The 
coefficient for non-interest income is highly significant at the one percent level. Finally, 
following Bostandzic et al. (2014), the regression of ΔMES is also re-estimated using 
country fixed effects (column 6). In order to avoid multicollinearity issues, 
macroeconomic control variables and regulatory control variables are omitted when 
running the regressions with country fixed effects. The coefficients for profitability and 
size continue to be statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the market-to-
book ratio loses its statistical significance. Again, the regression results suggest that non-
interest income positively impacts bank contribution to global systemic risk. Lastly, with 
respect to regulatory variables the negative impact of capital stringency and the positive 
impact of supervisory power continue to hold across all robustness checks. 
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6.2.3. European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
In order to check whether the analysis can provide evidence for arguments that size, 
market-to-book ratio, and non-interest income are persistent determinants of banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk across various time periods and geographical areas , the 
regressions of ΔMES are re-estimated for the episodes surrounding the two peaks of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. As reported in Table 7, the results for the bank-specific 
accounting variables do not hold anymore for the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
A bank´s operating profit margin positively enters the regression of the pre- and post- 
crisis change in the MES measure with respect to local indices for the first peak of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the Greek bailout agreement in May 2010, in 
apparent contradiction of the results for the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. However, as 
presented in columns 2, 3, and 4, a bank`s profitability does not seem to have affected a 
bank`s contribution to global systemic risk during the first peak of the crisis nor does it 
seem to have impacted contribution to local or global systemic risk during the second 
peak of the crisis. A bank’s size only has a significant impact on ΔMES with respect to a 
global sector index during the episode around the second peak of the said crisis. The 
coefficient for the market-to-book ratio is not significant for any of the regressions. A 
logical and sound explanation for this apparent contradiction might have to do with the 
fact that, following Allen and Carletti (2006), the systemic risk present at the height of 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 had already been transferred to the public purse, 
resulting in higher public debt schedules, but lower systemic risk emanating from the 
global banking industry. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the results for the Global Financial Crisis around the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, greater capital stringency has a positive effect on banks contribution 
to both global and local systemic risk for the episodes around both peaks of the sovereign 
crisis. This is in line with the findings of Barth et al. (2004), suggesting that capital 













The table displays the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the changes in the MES systemic risk 
measure on a set of accounting, macroeconomic, and regulatory variables for the first and second phases of 




*** Statistical significance at the 1% level, ** Statistical significance at the 5% level *     Statistical significance at 
the 10% level 
7 Conclusion 
This study analyzes key drivers of banks’ contribution to both local and global systemic 
risk on a global level during the Global Financial Crisis around the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 as well as during the first peak of the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis around the Greek bailout agreement in May 2010 and during the second peak 
of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis around the Greek austerity package in June 2011. 
During all selected crisis periods, banks’ contribution to local and global systemic risk 
increased significantly for the total sample of global banks as well as for the subsamples 
of North American banks, European banks and for the subsample of banks located in the 
Asia/Pacific region respectively.  The difference between the pre- and the post-crisis 
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period marginal expected shortfall measures ΔMES is statistically significant at the one 
percent level across all crisis periods and across all subsamples. Banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk is the highest during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, and for, this 
specific period, the contribution of European banks to local and global systemic risk was 
higher than the contribution found in other geographic areas. These findings are in line 
with the observation that the European banks in the sample have on average the greatest 
total assets, are the most leveraged and have the highest non-interest income across all 
crisis periods. This is in strict accordance with the conjectures advanced on this matter by 
previous academic studies observing that all variables herein described are have been 
found to be persistent drivers of systemic risk. However, interestingly, larger and more 
leveraged European banks, on average, did not contribute more towards local and global 
systemic risk during the periods around the two peaks of the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis.  
The cross-sectional regressions of the difference between the pre- and the post-crisis 
period marginal expected shortfall measure ΔMES on a set of bank-specific variables, 
regulatory variables, and standard macroeconomic control variables provide evidence that 
size, and market-to-book ratio are positively related to banks’ contribution to local and 
global systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  This is in line with the 
findings of Bostandzic et al. (2014), that suggest that larger and more sophisticated banks 
contributed more to systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis. Furthermore, more 
profitable banks seem to have contributed less to the risk of the financial sector during 
the Global Financial Crisis. In line with Beltratti and Stulz (2009) and Andriosopoulos et 
al. (2014) the present findings demonstrate that higher capital stringency is negatively 
related to systemic risk while greater supervisor power is positively related to systemic 
risk, suggesting that during the crisis stronger supervisors took more corrective measures 
that were costly for shareholders. Overall, these findings are robust for alternative 
definitions of the marginal expected shortfall measure, for a subsample of banks including 
only banks with total assets in excess of 10 billion U.S. dollars and for regression models 
including country fixed effects rather than macroeconomic and regulatory control 
variables. However, in the global analysis of banks contribution to systemic risk these 
bank- specific accounting variables cannot not explain systemic risk during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. This is in line with the findings of Bostandzic et al. (2014) that 
bank-specific accounting variables explaining systemic risk for the Global Financial 
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Crisis  of 2008 cannot explain the contribution of global banks during other crisis periods 
such as the Mexican pesos crisis in 1994,  the Asian crisis in 1977  , the dotcom bubble 
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The table displays descriptive statistics for regulatory variables used in the cross-sectional regressions. The 
table presents the average of the capital stringency index, the supervisor power index and the supervisor 
independence index obtained from the database constructed by Bath et al. (2013) index for all the countries 
in the dataset. More precisely the table displays the average of the survey conducted in 2007 and the survey 





                                                             C.String.             Sub.Power            Indepen. 
Argentina     5.5                        9.5  1.0 
Austria      4.0  11.0  3.0 
Bahrain      8.0  11.8  2.5 
Belgium                   5.5  11.0  2.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina                  4.0               12.5  3.0 
Botswana    10.0                 6.5  1.5 
Brazil      5.0  13.5  2.0 
Bulgaria                   8.5  11.0  3.0 
Canada      5.0     8.5  3.0 
Chile      6.0   12.5  0.0 
Colombia     7.0  11.8  0.5 
Croatia      6.5  11.5  3.0 
Cyprus       8.5  11.5  3.0 
Finland      6.0                        9.0  2.5 
France      8.0                 9.3  2.5 
Germany     7.5                 9.5  1.0 
Greece      5.5                 9.5  1.5 
Hungary                  7.0  13.8  3.0 
India      9.0  10.0  2.5 
Indonesia     9.0  14.5  2.5 
Italy      6.0  10.0  1.5 
Kenya      8.0  13.5  1.5 
Lithuania     5.0  12.8  1.5 
Luxembourg     7.0  11.5  2.0 
Mauritius     7.0  14.0  2.0 
Norway                   7.0.                       8.5  2.5 
Pakistan                    9.0  13.5  2.0 
Palestine    10.0                 9.0  1.0 
Peru      8.0  13.0  2.0 
Poland      8.0  10.0  2.0 
Portugal                   6.5  13.0  3.0 
Serbia      5.0  13.0  3.0 
Spain      8.0  10.8  2.0 
Sri Lanka     5.0  11.0  2.0 
Switzerland     7.0  12.5  2.0 
Thailand     9.0  12.0  2.0 
United Kingdom     5.0  10.0  2.0 
United States     7.5  13.8  2.0 
Venezuela     9.0  13.5  1.0 
 
